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Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights
MARK A. EDWARDS
Compliance with—or deviance from—law is often dependent upon the
law’s convergence with—or divergence from—normative sensibilities.
Where the legality and social acceptability of behavior diverge, some
deviance is socially acceptable. Property rights evolve in response to
changes in normative sensibilities. Constructing a model of acceptable
deviance and applying it to property rights, we can predict and actually
observe the evolution of property rights in response to changes in
normative sensibilities in areas as diverse as file-sharing, foreclosures, the
use of public space, and fishing rights. We can also predict and observe
stresses in legal institutions created by divergences in the legality and
social acceptability of behavior with regard to property rights. Law
functions as an anchor on behavior, providing stability, but also space for
deviance which permits the evolution of property rights.
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Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights
MARK A. EDWARDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Where the legality and social acceptability of behavior converge, legal
institutions function well. Where they diverge, it is ultimately the law,
rather than the behavior, that changes. Why that is true tells us a great deal
about the function of law and its relationship to the normative sensibilities
of those who create it, enforce it, and live in its shadow.
This Article examines divergences between social acceptability and
legality of behavior with regard to property rights and considers what those
divergences tell us about the nature of law and property rights generally.
Based upon the insight that behavior often occurs within limits of
normatively acceptable deviance around law, rather than within the terms
of the law itself, Part II constructs an “acceptable deviance” model of the
relationship between the legality and social acceptability of behavior,
focusing on instances in which legality and social acceptability diverge and
either deviance becomes socially acceptable, or compliance becomes
socially unacceptable. Part III explores and compares utilitarian and
normative models of compliance and deviance with utilitarian and
normative models of the evolution of property rights. Part IV then applies
the acceptable deviance model to the evolution of property rights. The
model allows us to predict and actually observe the evolution of property
rights in response to changes in normative sensibilities in areas as diverse
as natural resources, copyright, foreclosures, and the use of public space.
We can also predict and actually observe stresses in legal institutions
created by divergences in the legality and social acceptability of behavior.
The Article concludes that law functions as an anchor on behavior,
providing stability but also space for deviance, which permits the evolution
of property rights.
II. A MODEL OF ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE
Law and behavior have a tenuous and sometimes tense relationship.
They are influenced by each other’s gravitational pull. They do not merge,
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. My sincere thanks for their
invaluable insights and generosity of time and spirit to Sonia Katyal, Eduardo Peñalver, my colleagues
at the William Mitchell College of Law faculty works-in-progress colloquium, panel participants at the
2009 Law and Society conference, and commenters at PropertyProf, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
property/.
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but they cannot break free of each other. Sometimes law is enforced,
sometimes it isn’t; sometimes law is complied with, sometimes not.1 Often
regulators and the regulated seem to reach an implicit agreement about
which laws will be enforced and complied with, and under what
circumstances.2 That agreement seems to be the product of innumerable
day-to-day encounters between the state and its citizens.3 I have referred to
the limits of socially acceptable deviance around law as “parameters of
acceptable deviance” or PADs.4 Within these parameters are behaviors
that are illegal but socially acceptable; their boundaries are the point at
which law is actually enforced. Those boundaries become, in a sense, the
informal but real law.
The simple model below provides a convenient illustration of the
convergence and divergence of behavior’s legality and its social
acceptability. It helps to predict the movement of behaviors across
boundaries of legality and social acceptability and to demonstrate the
reaction of legal institutions to divergences between them.
Legality and Acceptability Model
Legal

Illegal

Normatively Acceptable

Normatively Unacceptable

1
Grattet and Jenness have observed that statutes “cast a shadow” over law enforcement, but do
not control it. Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency
Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
893, 935 (2005). As Tom Tyler explains, behavior diverges from law in many areas, “from tax evasion
to drunk driving and drug abuse,” despite enforcement efforts. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 19 (1990) (“[P]olice officers and judges have been unable to stop” many types of illegal
behavior); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 60–61 (1963) (noting that even within contractual relationships, norms rather than
contracts are the primary governor of behavior).
2
See Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 57 fig.1 (2006) (depicting “the effect of the relationship between legality and
normative acceptability on enforcement”).
3
See id.
4
See id.
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The model works this way: in the upper left quadrant are behaviors that are
both legal and socially acceptable. In the lower right quadrant are
behaviors that are both illegal and socially unacceptable. Legal institutions
generally work well in protecting behaviors in the upper left quadrant,
while sanctioning behaviors are in the lower right quadrant.
Conversely, legal institutions often falter in reaction to behaviors in the
opposite quadrants. In the upper right quadrant are behaviors that are
illegal, but socially acceptable; interestingly, these tend not to trigger an
enforcement response from legal institutions. In the lower left quadrant are
behaviors that are legal, but socially unacceptable. No formal enforcement
response is possible, since the behavior is not illegal. In the absence of a
formal enforcement response, these behaviors may—and often do—trigger
an informal enforcement response from the community in the form of
social sanctions.
The model can be applied across several legal and behavioral
boundaries. Consider, for example, the relationship between driving
behavior and speed limits in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone.
Traffic Law and Driving
Legal

Normatively Acceptable

Normatively Unacceptable

Illegal

65 m.p.h.

65–79 m.p.h.

< 65 m.p.h.

> 79 m.p.h.

As the model above suggests, it is generally both legal to drive sixtyfive m.p.h. and socially acceptable (although just barely). On the other
hand, it is both illegal and generally socially unacceptable to drive at
speeds much over eighty m.p.h. Doing so might trigger both informal
social sanctions—such as harsh looks from other drivers or muttered
curses—and a formal enforcement response from the state, in the form of a
speeding citation.
More interesting, however, are the instances in which the legality and
social acceptability of behavior diverge. It is here that deviance may occur
within parameters of acceptability. Again, consider speeding: it is formally
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deviant but socially acceptable to drive between sixty-five to seventy-nine
m.p.h. Interestingly, that behavior, though illegal, is very unlikely to
trigger a formal enforcement response. On the other hand, driving much
under sixty-five m.p.h., though legal, is socially deviant and is very likely
to trigger an informal enforcement response through social sanctions in the
form of tailgating, flashing headlights, or obscene gestures. In other
words, behavior that is formally deviant but socially acceptable does not
generate an enforcement response from the state; behavior that is formally
compliant but socially unacceptable generates an enforcement response
from society.
Take a moment to consider how extraordinary this common-place
behavior really is. The state goes to the highly unusual effort of informing
its citizenry about the content of the law. Yet each person knows, without
being told, that the law as written does not, ultimately, set the boundaries
of behavior. The social acceptability of behavior sets its boundaries. Even
more extraordinary, the state implicitly acknowledges that system, and
actually sanctions behavior that is outside the boundaries of social
acceptability, rather than merely outside the law. It is all so common-place
that most of us have lived with it our entire lives and never even noticed.
In addition to demonstrating the convergence and divergence between
the legality or social acceptability of behavior, the model can be used to
test predictions about the evolution of law in reaction to changes in
normative sensibilities. Behaviors should tend to rotate in a counterclockwise direction through the model. As behaviors move toward social
acceptability they usually move toward legality. When behaviors become
socially unacceptable, they may soon become illegal. As Roscoe Pound
observed more than a century ago, “[i]n all cases of divergence between
the standard of the common law and the standard of the public, it goes
without saying that the latter will prevail in the end.”5
Until legality and social acceptability converge, there can be serious
and predictable malfunctions triggered in legal institutions. Because
behaviors that are legal but socially unacceptable, or illegal but socially
acceptable, tend to stress legal institutions, they can each create pathways
for abuse. These two dangers—which might be called “popular justice”
and “selective enforcement”—are represented in the model below.

5

Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615 (1907).
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Malfunctions Triggered by Divergence of Legality and Acceptability
Legal

Selective
Enforcement

Normatively Acceptable

Normatively Unacceptable

Illegal

Popular Justice

Recall that behaviors which are legal but socially unacceptable do not
generate a formal enforcement response, but instead generate informal
social sanctions. That sanctions are informal “does not mean that they are
less effective than direct enforcement by the courts and/or by the police.”6
These sanctions may be as mild as hard stares or as extreme as vigilantism.
An example from our nation’s recent past might be a mixed-race
relationship. The danger here is obvious: in the absence of a formal
enforcement response, the ugliest form of “popular justice”—vigilantism—
is always a threat.
Conversely, behaviors that are illegal but socially acceptable generally
do not generate a formal enforcement response because legal institutions
generally sanction behaviors that are outside of PADs, rather than outside
the law. An ill-motivated enforcement officer, however, can selectively
enforce the law against some people because of factors other than their
behavior, and immunize themselves against charges of unlawful
motivation because of the behavior’s formal illegality.
Consider again the example of speeding. Driving seventy-five m.p.h.
in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone is socially acceptable and is therefore unlikely
to generate a formal enforcement response. But assume the driver is
African American and the police officer is a bigot. Because the speeding is
formally illegal, an unlawfully-motivated police officer could stop a
minority driver and, according to the Supreme Court, immunize himself
from the charge of unlawful motivation through the formal illegality of the
6
UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
INTRODUCTION 6 (2000).
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behavior.
The next Part examines existing models of deviance and compliance
and compares them with models of the evolution of property rights. After
that, I apply the PADs model of acceptable deviance to the evolution of
four very different property rights and interests.
III. MODELS OF COMPLIANCE, DEVIANCE, AND THE EVOLUTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Compliance and Deviance
Scholars have identified three models of decision-making that may be
applied to the decision whether to comply with a law or regulation: (1)
cognitive, in which actors make decisions based upon “taken-for-granted
roles and scripts” without conscious considerations of alternatives; (2)
instrumental or rational choice, in which actors make decisions primarily
based on their material self interest; and (3) normative or moral, in which
actors make decisions based on ingrained beliefs about the acceptability of
behavior.8
Cognitive models emphasize taken-for-granted cultural rules that make
decision-making seem unnecessary.9 Mark Suchman offers the example of
a man’s decision about what to wear to a professional conference; chances
are, he does not consciously decide—regardless of whether it is a matter of
rational choice or normative sensibility—to forego wearing a skirt.
Instead, he unconsciously follows cultural rules that render such conscious
decision-making unnecessary.10
Rational choice models, of course, suggest that actors will choose to
comply when the cost of deviance exceeds its benefits. The cost of
deviance can be calculated by discounting the penalty that will be assessed
for non-compliance by the likelihood of its assessment, and then
7
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In Whren, the Supreme Court held that
the actual motivation of police in stopping two African American men for a minor traffic violation was
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 812 (“Not only have we never held, outside the
context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted
the contrary.”). The minor traffic violation was a pretext used by the police to search the two men for
drugs because the officers lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the men
possessed drugs. Id. at 808–09. The defendants were not permitted to introduce evidence that
allegedly showed that the police rarely stopped vehicles for such minor violations. Id. at 815. The
Court held that as long as the police were justified in initiating the stop because of illegal driving
behavior, it would not consider the true motivations of the officers. See id. at 813 (stating that the
Court has been “unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations
of individual officers”). In other words, the formal illegality of the driving behavior immunized the
police from charges of unlawful motivation, despite the driving behavior’s social acceptability.
8
Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the
Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 475–76.
9
Id. at 476.
10
Id. at 475.
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subtracting from that amount the benefit of non-compliance. In order to
deter prohibited behavior, regulators must work the calculation backwards.
First, regulators must assign a value to the benefits of non-compliance;
then assess a penalty, discounted by the probability that it will be assessed,
that outweighs the benefit.12
The problem with this model is that, in reality, it generally does not
work well.13 It is based on two unlikely assumptions about the regulated:
first, that they can instantaneously and accurately perform a cost-benefit
analysis of compliance (in other words, that they can calculate the
deterrence value of a regulation); and second, that they will then rationally
choose whether to comply or not, based upon that calculation. It also
depends on two unlikely assumptions about regulators: first, that they can
accurately calculate the benefits of non-compliance; and second, that they
can assess penalties, correctly discounted by the likelihood of enforcement
that will deter the unwanted behavior.14 There is scant empirical evidence
that these assumptions are correct; in fact, much empirical evidence
suggests just the opposite.15 Moreover, for regulators, the system operates
against itself. Deterrence value depends enormously on the likelihood of
enforcement, but the relative benefit to society of compliance compared to
the cost of harmful behavior is lessened by every dollar devoted to
enforcement.
Yet people are—or at least appear to be—generally law-abiding.16 If
deterrence does not produce compliance, then what does? It turns out that
compliance is not a product primarily of the threat of penalty for noncompliance; it is primarily a product of the regulated’s agreement that the
prohibited behavior is unacceptable. “Simple deterrence will often fail to
produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address . . .
11

For example, if the penalty is $100,000, and the likelihood of its assessment is ten percent, then
the deterrence value of the regulation is $10,000. In theory, if the benefit of non-compliance is less
than $10,000, then the regulated will comply.
12
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
176–77 (1968) (explaining calculations used to deter prohibited behavior).
13
See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just?
Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2000) (noting that “[i]t is a
potential offender’s perception of whether he or she can manipulate the system, not the reality, that
matters”).
14
This collection of unlikely assumptions is sometimes referred to as “the deterrence trap.” See
John C. Coffee, Jr.,“No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389–92 (1981) (explaining the application of the
deterrence trap); Christine Parker, The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 591–603 (2006) (describing the application of
deterrence and compliance traps as regulatory enforcers).
15
See Robinson, supra note 13, at 1843 (“Punishment will not deter one who cannot make the
logical connection between criminal conduct and punishment or one who cannot resist the impulse to
commit the criminal conduct no matter how clear the resulting liability or how unpleasant the
consequences.”).
16
See TYLER, supra note 1, at 3 (“Americans are typically law-abiding people.”).
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perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior.” Tom Tyler has shown
that “[t]he most important normative influence on compliance with the law
is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her
sense of right and wrong.”18 When it does, he concludes, people become
self-regulating, and “[s]elf-regulating people are law-abiding [people].”19
In other words, compliance is the result of law’s convergence with
normative beliefs.
Recognizing the limits of the instrumental model of compliance, some
rational choice theorists have acknowledged the importance of norms in
compliance decisions, but have tried to place them within a rational choice
framework.20 This effort generally takes one of two forms. Some rational
choice theorists have argued that the decision whether to obey or defy a
norm is just another cost-benefit decision.21 An actor might weigh, for
example, whether the cost to his reputation of disobeying a norm is less
than the one-time economic benefit of doing so. If the benefit exceeds the
cost, the actor would be expected to disobey the norm. For example,
Robert Cooter regards both law and norms as means of imposing costs on
unwanted behavior. In his view, “[t]he state can impose law from the top
down by enacting novel obligations, as illustrated by most regulatory law;
or, alternatively, law can grow from the bottom up by enforcing social
norms.”22 Interestingly, Cooter suggests the appropriate role for the state
with regard to norms is to use law to “correct failures in social norms.”23
“Social norms are ‘perfect’ when law cannot improve upon them relative
to . . . standards of efficiency.”24 In other words, norms fail when they fail
to produce behavior that maximizes economic efficiency. In such cases,
law must be used as an instrument to produce a better result, but used
sparingly because “[s]uccessful state enforcement typically requires a close
alignment of law with morality, so state officials enjoy informal support
from private persons.”25
17

Parker, supra note 14, at 592.
TYLER, supra note 1, at 64.
19
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiii (2002).
20
See Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 157, 164–65 (2000) (“[A] social order based on laws can be maintained without massive coercion
only if most people, most of the time, abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social tenets
embedded in the law. It can be maintained only if the majority of the transactions engaged in are
sufficiently undergirded by social norms, and thus do not require constant intervention by public
authorities. Above all, laws work best and are needed least when social norms are intrinsically
followed.”).
21
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 972
(1997) (“[T]he social norm must have a punishment-induced equilibrium with an efficient level of
deterrence.”).
22
Id. at 947.
23
Id. at 949.
24
Id. at 972.
25
Id. at 979.
18
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Other rational choice theorists have attempted to fit norms within the
rational choice model by suggesting that even if an individual’s discrete
decision to obey a norm is not the product of cost-benefit analysis, norms
are the product of an unconscious collective cost-benefit decision, whereby
a society evolves norms that embody economic efficiency.26 Norms are, in
this view, an extrinsic or environmental force that are either entered into
the rational choice calculus, or produced by it.27 For example, Robert
Ellickson, in his well-known study of the relationship between legal rules
and norms with respect to the maintenance of boundaries between cattle
ranchers, regards both law and norms as types of rules that produce
efficient results, where a “rule” is defined as a “guideline for human
conduct” that “actually influences the behavior either of those to whom it
is addressed or of those who detect others breaching the guideline.”28
According to Ellickson, norms are rules that emanate from “social forces”
and laws are rules that emanate from governments.29 Law is enforced by
the state; norms are enforced through sanctions imposed by private
parties.30 While norms and law differ in the source of their creation and in
the identity of their enforcers, they are nonetheless the product of rational
choice decision-making.
But norms are not encompassed within rational choice theory quite so
easily. As Amitai Etzioni points out, regarding norms solely as an
extrinsic force misses their intrinsic and possibly non-rational nature.31
Non-rational sources of norms might include “tradition, institutions,
customs, and habit.”32 Norms, therefore, may be in part the fruit of
extrinsic rational choice, but are also in part created and enforced without
regard to rational choice.33 In this way, norm-based decision-making often
arrives at the same result as cognitive decision-making, but through a
different process. In other words, like the rational choice model, normative
26
See id. at 953 (explaining that efficiency in common law rules might be explained by judicial
enforcement of social norms, which “evolve towards efficiency”); Etzioni, supra note 20, at 176
(“Behavior that is endorsed by social norms and also rewarding in narrow economic terms is likely to
be the most stable. Conversely, behavior that is censured by social norms and economically
unrewarding is most likely to be abandoned.”).
27
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 128,
167 (1991) (“[W]hen social conditions are close-knit, informal norms will encourage people in nonzero-sum situations to make choices that will conjoin to produce the maximum aggregate objective
payoff.”); Etzioni, supra note 20, at 172 (citing Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997)) (describing the conditions that produce a
norm).
28
ELLICKSON, supra note 27, at 128.
29
Id. at 127.
30
Id. at 127–28.
31
Etzioni, supra note 20, at 173.
32
Id.
33
See id. at 175 (stating that “social norms themselves are in part the fruits of rational choice” and
once this is accepted, “one can then explore the ways in which the factors modeled by law and
economics and law and society may be effectively combined into a socioeconomic perspective”).
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and moral models presuppose conscious choices by decision-makers, but
the influence of normative beliefs is intrinsic, not extrinsic. Based on those
beliefs, “people rarely act in ways that they, themselves, genuinely believe
to be morally wrong.”34 Normative models suggest that “when morality
and law concur, people behave in ways that comply with the law,”35 when
they diverge, deviance results.36
This intrinsic process has an extrinsic effect: law evolves to embody
norms. “Law often grows from social norms that create order from
consensus obligations.”37 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz describes how, “[a]s a
consensus develops within a group or community that a certain type of
behavior is undesirable, the consensus begins to form a baseline level of
expectation.”38 Thus the real meaning of law—that is to say, how it is
lived—is determined not only by regulators, but by the regulated, “across
the traditionally understood boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of
the legal system.”39
The intrinsic power of norms has important implications for
compliance with—and enforcement of—law. Intrinsic willingness to obey
the law is strongest “when the law faithfully reflects broadly shared
values.”40 On the other hand, “social order based on laws can be
maintained without massive coercion only if most people, most of the time,
abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social tenets embedded
in the law.”41 In short, “laws work best and are needed least when social
norms are intrinsically followed.”42 It is not surprising, therefore, that
scholars have found that regulatory enforcement works best when
accompanied by “extraregulatory factors” including a “sense of
34

Suchman, supra note 8, at 480.
Id. at 487.
36
Normative sensibilities that could lead to formal deviance may be overcome by an intervening
belief in the legitimacy of the legal system itself, and the consequent belief that one should obey the
law even if one normatively or morally disagrees with its requirements. Moreover, by regarding the
legal system as legitimate, one may be persuaded that the law itself is moral, and adjust one’s
normative sensibilities to match the law. Id. at 488.
37
Cooter, supra note 21, at 978.
38
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1280 (2000).
39
Grattet & Jenness, supra note 1, at 935; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 406, 409 (1999)
(explaining that, with regard to employment law, regulatory practices, as well as those regulated by
those practices, are what give law its meaning). Law is not given meaning only in regulatory practices.
It is also given meaning by the regulated. As Edelman has observed with regard to employment law,
the real meaning of law is created in part within the “realm that it seeks to regulate.” Lauren B.
Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil Rights, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 337, 339 (Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).
40
Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1147
(2007).
41
Etzioni, supra note 20, at 165.
42
Id. If compliance with law and norms depends, as rational choice theorists suggest, upon a
cost-benefit decision-making process, then externally imposed deterrence costs will be enormous,
dependent upon a credible threat of enforcement.
35
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commitment” and “the influence of peer and other group pressures.”
Recognizing, at least implicitly, that compliance often reflects the
complier’s agreement that a regulation accurately defines acceptable
behavior, regulators have begun more openly to attempt to prevent
unwanted behavior by modifying perceptions of behavior’s acceptability,
rather than by attempting to deter that behavior by threat of penalty.44
“[L]aws supported by social norms are likely to be significantly more
enforceable.”45 “Responsive regulation,” as it has been labeled, attempts
“to build moral commitment to compliance” first and then attempts to deter
non-compliance through the threat of penalty assessment only if regulators
are unable to build that commitment.46
Responsive regulation envisions enforcement techniques arranged in a
pyramid with persuasive techniques forming the base of the pyramid and
more coercive techniques toward the top.47 “The objective is that firms
and individuals will comply, even without enforcement action, through
internalization and institutionalization of compliance norms, informal
pressure and the indirect threat of the ‘benign big gun’ at the top of the
pyramid.”48 “In order for responsive regulation to even be possible,
regulators must have the capacity to convince people that regulatory
offenses represent shared values.”49 But, as Christine Parker has found,
regulators cannot simply unilaterally create newly drawn boundaries of
socially acceptable behavior. Unless the regulated agree with “the moral
seriousness of the law,” they regard attempts at its enforcement as unfair,
which has “a negative influence on long-term compliance.”50 The decision
to comply or not with any law or regulation is shaped in part by whether
the regulated party considers herself a party to that implicit “social
contract,” that itself is the product of “repeated, reciprocal interactions”
between regulators and the regulated, which act as a type of negotiation
over shared expectations.51

43
Chris Koski & Peter J. May, Interests and Implementation: Fostering Voluntary Regulatory
Actions, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 329, 330 (2006).
44
See Parker, supra note 14, at 592 (suggesting that regulators should use mixes of regulatory
styles to improve compliance, including addressing perceptions of the morality of the regulated
behavior, rather than relying on deterrence alone).
45
Etzioni, supra note 20, at 159.
46
Parker, supra note 14, at 592.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 614.
50
Id. at 591–92.
51
Id. at 614; see also Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Perspectives of Farmers,
Homebuilders, and Marine Facilities, 27 LAW & POL’Y 317, 337 (2005) (defining the social contract as
“a set of shared norms about acceptable behaviors on the part of regulated entities and regulators”).
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B. The Evolution of Property Rights
The debate over how property rights evolve mirrors with remarkable
consistency debates over motivations for compliance with, or deviance
from, law. Just as scholars have constructed cognitive, instrumental, and
normative models of decision-making, they have posited public choice,
economic, and normative models of the evolution of property rights. By
applying theories of compliance and deviance to theories of property rights
evolution, both are illuminated.
James Krier states that the concept of property and property rights
must have preceded the existence of the state; therefore, state action cannot
explain every instance of the development of property rights.52 There are
two possibilities that explain the emergence of property rights. First,
property rights might be “the product of intentional undertakings: property
is ‘designed.’”53 Conversely, however, property rights regimes might
result from the “unintended consequence of individual actions: property
arises ‘spontaneously.’”54 In other words, property rights can be produced
“formally by a government or informally by the cooperation of
individuals.”55 The self-organization of property rights regimes may be
analogous to the spontaneous emergence of complex systems that has
generated a great deal of recent attention in the biological and physical
sciences: “The most provocative claim of the prophets of complexity is
that complex systems often exhibit spontaneous properties of selforganization.”56 “Institutions, including property rights, emerge and
develop in response to evolving economic and political conditions . . . .”57
“The state has a passive role [in a process of establishing property rights]
and supplies rules in response to pressures [from the grassroots
level] . . . .”58 As Ugo Mattei puts it, “property law does not need the
existence of the state.”59
Once established, property rights are often described as providing
stability that allows economically efficient transactions.60 But property
rights are not static. Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal note that, “there
52
James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
139, 143–44 (2009).
53
Id. at 145.
54
Id.
55
Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S360 (2002).
56
Paul Krugman, Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 415
(1994). Studying phenomena as diverse as the spatial and social division of city neighborhoods and the
routes ants take in gathering food, researchers have discovered that “starting from disordered initial
conditions they tend to move toward highly ordered behavior.” Id.
57
Leonid Polishchuk & Alexei Savvateev, Spontaneous (Non)emergence of Property Rights, 12
ECON. OF TRANSITION 103, 104 (2004).
58
THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 261 (Mark Perlman & E.
Roy Weintraub eds., 1990).
59
MATTEI, supra note 6, at 4, 5.
60
Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1098.
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can be no doubt that, once a robust system of private property has been
established, the precise content of that standard bundle of property rights
shifts over time in response to varying pressures and incentives, both
internal and external to the institution of ownership.”61 But exactly why
and how property rights evolve is a matter of considerable debate.
Scholars have posited public choice, economic, and normative models of
changes in property rights.
Public choice theorists argue that the evolution of property rights is
dependent primarily upon political power.
Simply put, “societies
reallocate property rights when some exogenous political realignment
enables a powerful group to grab a larger share of the pie.”62 As a result,
public choice theorists tend to be skeptical of economic theories that
suggest property rights evolve toward optimal economic efficiency. Saul
Levmore, for example, has noted that because “optimal rules may be
impossible to ascertain” any claim that property rights evolve toward
optimal efficiency is necessarily suspect.63
Unlike the public choice model, economic and normative models do
not presuppose that property rights emerge from deliberate acts of political
power. According to Harold Demsetz, property rights move from common
usage to private property when some external factor makes common usage
less economically efficient than private property—in other words, when
the benefits of adopting private property rights outweigh the costs of doing
so.64 Demsetz predicted that private property rights would replace open
access commons when the benefits of internalizing, through the allocation
of private property rights, the externalities resulting from common use of a
resource outweigh the costs of creating and defending private property
rights.65 This might occur when increased demand for a resource increases
the cost of externalities associated with common usage, relative to the cost
of allocating private property rights. Alternatively, it might occur when
developments in technology reduce the cost of allocating private rights
relative to the cost of externalities associated with common usage.66
Drawing upon accounts of the fur trade among Native Americans during
and after increased demand for furs following contact with Europeans,
Demsetz predicted that property rights would move from common usage to
private property when increases in the complexity and magnitude of
61

Id. at 1100.
Banner, supra note 55, at S360.
63
Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 185
(2003).
64
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967).
65
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 77, 78 (2009) (discussing Demsetz’s theory that private property
would replace open-access property regimes when the “benefits [of] internalizing externalities
exceeded the costs of formalizing and defending private property rights”).
66
Demsetz, supra note 64, at 350.
62
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economic relationships resulted in increased scarcity of valuable
resources.67
In the aftermath of Demsetz’s seminal work, scholars have critiqued
and refined his cost-benefit model. Barry Field has noted that the
transition between open access commons and private property rights is not
a one-way journey following the evolution of societies from primitive to
complex, but rather a two-way street; that is, private property rights
sometimes transition to open access commons.68 Other scholars have
noted that even with Fields’s additional insight, the Demsetz cost-benefit
model does not seem to capture the dynamic changes in property rights
observable in the real world.69 Stuart Banner, for example, has stated that
“[p]roperty rights cannot simply be assumed, like other goods, to be
produced in a pattern that responds to the changing costs and benefits of
producing them.”70 Regardless of whether the right is produced formally
or informally, its production “is necessarily a collective endeavor.”71
Therefore, transitions in property rights regimes, according to Banner, will
inevitably face collective action problems.72 Banner is persuaded, like
Demsetz, that transitions in property regimes do seem to move toward
efficiency.73 His objection is that Demsetz fails to describe a means by
which the transition occurs, and in particular fails to identify a means of
overcoming two obstacles: collective action and transaction costs.74 As
Banner states, “[a]n initial allocation of property rights gives rise to a
certain amount of path dependence.”75 That path dependence is, in
Banner’s characterization, a type of transaction cost: it makes reallocation
of rights more difficult, whatever the economic efficiencies.76 To
overcome those obstacles, the expected payoffs to the winners under the
new regime must be sufficient to overcome the cost. Such was the case,
according to Banner, when English colonists reallocated property rights in
67
See id. at 352 (proposing that the rise of the fur trade increased the value of furs to the Indians
and increased the scale of hunting activity, thus increasing the importance of externalities associated
with free hunting and changing the property right system in such a way as to “take account of the
economic effects made important by the fur trade”).
68
See Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319, 320 (1989) (arguing that
factors such as population growth and increases in demand do not invariably cause society to move
away from common toward individual property institutions but in fact sometimes “encourage greater
use of common property”).
69
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 84 (stating that “Demsetz’s one-way
evolutionary account is not fully supported by history”).
70
Banner, supra note 55, at S360.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at S361.
74
See id. (stating that Demsetz’s theory is missing an “account of how a society can overcome the
obstacles that might block a transition to a more efficient property regime” as well as an “account of
the mechanism by which efficiency gets translated into political action”).
75
Id. at S364.
76
Id.
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Maori lands to their own benefit.
Bell and Parchomovsky, responding to Demsetz and his critics, have
refined the economic model of property rights evolution by positing a three
dimensional cost-benefit model of property rights evolution, along axes of
the number of owners, asset configuration, and extent of the owner’s
dominion.78 They note that the number of owners can run on a continuum
from open access to a single owner and everything in between.79
Similarly, the extent of dominion over property can expand or contract in
reaction to changing circumstances or sensibilities.80 In response to
changing economic incentives, the configuration of assets can and does
change frequently. For example, tracts of real property are divided or
combined81 and, in a contemporary example, music may be sold on a pertrack basis rather than in whole albums.
But perhaps the primary driver in the evolution of property rights is
neither political nor economic. As Carol Rose stated, “property begins in a
social context.”82 Peñalver and Katyal agree:
Ownership of land and the structures attached to land provide
the spaces and places in which we carry out our social
existence . . . . Accordingly, property rights and the social
norms that accompany (and are often reinforced by) property
ownership play an important role in ordering our interactions
with other human beings.83
In this way, property rights are “broadly reflective of evolving community
values.”84 Rose noted that the destruction of the property rights claims of
people who exist outside of social groups is “a matter of relative
indifference” to those within.85 Demsetz himself recognized that changes
in property rights regimes might result not from economic incentives but
from “changes in social mores.”86
Joseph Singer argues that normative sensibilities must play a crucial
77

Id. at S363.
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 86.
79
Id.
80
See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he dominion of property owners may be restricted either by narrowing the
rights and privileges owners enjoy with respect to their property or by limiting the list of duty bearers
who must respect the rights of property owners.”).
81
Id. at 87.
82
Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 6 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Property and Language].
83
Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1132.
84
Id. at 1101.
85
Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 1, 29 [hereinafter Rose, Property and Expropriation]. For the seminal case
demonstrating Rose’s point, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 570 (1823), holding that
under authority of the crown, absolute title to land vested in civilized persons discovering barbarous
countries, and that Indians maintained only a right to occupancy.
86
Demsetz, supra note 64, at 350.
78
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87

role in the recognition of property rights. He notes that most people hold
two, somewhat contradictory, conceptions of property rights.88 The first is
what he calls the “castle conception,” which views restrictions on free use
of private property as presumptively illegitimate.89 The second is the
“environmental conception,” which views property rights not just as
private rights but also as a set of social obligations that legitimately restrict
the use of property.90 Deciding between them requires “normative
reflection” through which we weigh “the legitimacy of claims and the
significance of harms.”91 Accordingly, we rely upon property norms to
“shape our understanding of the meaning of property rights and the
legitimate contours of social relationships.”92 Norms do that by defining
“who is an ‘owner’ and who is a ‘non-owner’” with regard to property, and
then identifying social obligations, if any, that inhere in that ownership
interest.93
Normative property rights systems seem to arise with reference to, but
separate from, formal legal systems without planning, through the
cumulative effect of individual acts. In many ways, they are selforganizing systems—“systems that, even when they start from an almost
homogeneous or almost random state, spontaneously form large-scale
patterns.”94 Those “local, short-range interactions can create large-scale
structure.”95 Normative property systems “may be considered ‘natural’
products of a spontaneous order whose idea is usually conveyed by the
term ‘customary law.’ . . . Many customary rules are at play, both very
old or very new. Often these rules are in competition with official rules
recognized by the modern state.”96
Singer offers an example from the law of nuisance to demonstrate the
primacy of normative sensibilities over instrumental considerations in
defining property rights. Rational choice theorists might tell us that all
nuisance is reciprocal97: if noise from my factory interferes with your use
and enjoyment of your residence, then your insistence on quiet at your
residence interferes with my use and enjoyment of my factory. But “[t]ry
as the economists might to argue that the imposition of pollution on
87
See Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership 3
(Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished research paper, No. 08–06, Harvard Law School), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093341 (discussing the good neighbor conception of property).
88
Id. at 2–3.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 3.
91
Id. at 5.
92
Id. at 6.
93
Id. at 7.
94
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 3 (1996).
95
Id. at 17.
96
MATTEI, supra note 6, at 5–6.
97
See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960) (describing the
social cost problem as a “problem of a reciprocal nature”).
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homeowners is morally and legally equivalent to the homeowners’ desire
to limit the factory’s polluting activity, there is something in us that wants
to rebel and not to see the actions as equivalent.”98 That thing in us,
according to Singer, is the cultural power of both “conscious and
unconscious norms.”99 Norms lead us to regard the factory’s pollution,
rather than the homeowner’s limit on the pollution, as an externality that
the law should make internal to its creator.100
IV. ACCEPTABLE DEVIANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Here I apply the socially acceptable deviance model to compliance
with, and deviance from, particular property rights and interests. Three
preliminary issues should be addressed. The first is whether there is
anything that makes property rights and interests a particularly fertile
ground for this analysis. After all, while it is true that property rights
depend upon compliance and enforcement,101 the same can be said of other
types of rights. There are a number of reasons why property rights offer a
particularly useful subject of analysis. First, while the gap between formal
law and law-as-lived has been studied in insightful depth by sociologists
and political scientists with regard to criminal law102 and the regulation of
businesses,103 less attention has been paid to the gap between property
rights and behavior regarding property.104
Second, property is a uniquely social institution. After all, “what
makes something ‘property’ is precisely that others routinely recognize and
respect one’s claims,”105 with or without state enforcement of those claims.
98

Singer, supra note 87, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
100
Id.
101
See Banner, supra note 55, at S363 (“The organizers of a property system can deny the
system’s benefits to certain people simply by refusing to enforce those people’s claims.”).
102
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975) (discussing the selective
enforcement of laws by the police); Robinson, supra note 15, at 1841 (examining the divide between
the traditional aims of criminal law, and modern deference to lay institutions of justice).
103
See, e.g., Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Perspectives of Farmers, Homebuilders, and
Marine Facilities, 27 LAW & POL’Y 317, 317 (2005) (“In recent years regulatory scholars have turned
attention from studying the enforcement actions of regulatory agencies to consideration of the
motivations of regulated entities for complying with regulations.”). It is not surprising that scholars
have devoted particular attention to compliance with business regulation, given the vast regulatory
apparatus that operates with regard to commercial activity in most advanced economies. As Coglianese
and Kagan have stated, “regulatory agencies and the rules they promulgate have become prominent
components of contemporary legal systems, often eclipsing legislative and judicial rules in their
economic and social effects.” Introduction to REGULATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES xi, xi (Cary
Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2007). Regulators oversee, to a greater or lesser extent,
“workplace safety, financial security, air and water pollution, fire and accident prevention, earthquake
protection, health and elder care delivery, food and drug quality, and proper maintenance of airplanes,
elevators, school buses and railroad tracks.” Id.
104
But see ELLICKSON, supra note 27, at 123 (providing a careful study of normative and legal
constraints on behaviors regarding property in a rural community).
105
Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 85, at 3.
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The state often protects property rights through the enforcement of
criminal sanctions, including sanctions for trespass, robbery, and fraud.106
But formal enforcement of all property rights—like formal enforcement of
the speed limit—is far beyond the capacity of the state. Instead, property
rights depend upon some level of compliance: “One person’s property can
only exist, by and large, because other people accept it.”107 And
compliance, as we have seen, is largely dependent upon whether law
converges with normative sensibilities. We have also seen, where law and
normative sensibilities diverge, it is often the limits of normatively
acceptable deviance from law, rather than the law itself, that defines the
limits of rights. In other words, it is the social acceptability of property
rights claims, rather than their legality, that ultimately determines whether
such rights are respected and, therefore, exist. The phenomenon of
acceptable deviance is observable with regard to property rights—as are
the attendant dangers caused by the stresses acceptable deviance places
upon legal institutions: selective enforcement and popular justice.
Third, given the evolutionary and normative nature of property rights,
their enforcement provides fertile ground for the study of the gap between
the legality and social acceptability of behavior. If, as the theorists
reviewed in the previous section have argued, property rights evolve over
time, then gaps are likely to emerge between legality and social
acceptability. The PADs model is a very useful tool for examining such
gaps.
If it is correct that property rights are particularly suited to this
analysis, then a second preliminary issue is whether there is anything
compelling about these four types of property rights and interests—
copyright, housing, the use of public space, and fishing rights—that merits
close examination. Each of these rights and interests exists within a
rapidly shifting, contested terrain, where norms of socially acceptable
behavior may evolve earlier than, or in opposition to, the content of the
formal law. These potential gaps between legality and social acceptability
are, of course, the focus of the acceptable deviance model.
The last preliminary issue that merits discussion is whether the simple
PADs model applied to these property rights and interests is too simple. It
could, for example, be made more subtle and complex by examining
instances in which changes in law drive changes in norms, rather than the
reverse. In addition, it does not address contested norms of social
acceptability between groups with different socio-economic statuses.
106
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 40, at 1098 (“Laws of criminal trespass protect the
boundaries around real property established through market transactions. Laws prohibiting larceny,
fraud, robbery, and burglary similarly wrap privately determined entitlements within the safety of the
publicly enforced criminal law.”).
107
Rose, Property and Language, supra note 82, at 3.
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Those are phenomena that merit serious analysis, but they exceed the scope
of this Article.
A. Copyright
“[P]roperty rights in ideas are up for grabs where no such rights
seemed possible before.”108 The right to exclude others is traditionally
considered the most fundamental of all private property rights. But
advances in digital technology have rendered what once was protectable
through private property rights very difficult, and perhaps unwise,109 to
protect. Moreover, technological advances have created changes in
normative sensibilities regarding property rights. Nowhere is that clearer
than in the law of copyright. The development of digital technology that
created ease in sharing files also helped to create new norms governing
file-sharing. Bell and Parchomovsky note that the “[e]ase in digitizing
information and expressions, and the shortcomings of encryption
technology” have lead to widespread unauthorized duplication of
copyrighted materials.110 Barry Field would predict that the increase in the
cost of exclusion, and the resulting ineffective enforcement against
trespassers, would push expressive content away from private property
rights and toward open access.111 In fact, Bell and Parchomovsky
conclude, “this dynamic is present in the area of copyright law.”112 In that
unstable environment, non-commercial copying of music and film through
digital technology may have moved from the illegal/socially unacceptable
box to the illegal/socially acceptable box of the PADs model. As a result,
new informal property rights regimes have arisen, but not without
enormous controversy. The resulting confrontation has stressed legal
institutions. Legal institutions come under increasing pressure to align
their response to the society’s normative sensibility. Two recent cases that
have attracted considerable publicity offer prominent examples of
copyright owners pushing back against the increasing social acceptability
of copyright violations.

108

Levmore, supra note 63, at 194.
Bell and Parchomovsky note that holders of copyright have, in some ways, protected the
existence of their private property rights by narrowing the scope of their dominion. For example, many
holders of copyright have made their works available to users through a Creative Commons license
agreement under which royalty-free uses are available to anyone in return for acknowledgement of the
copyright. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 94–95 (describing how “copyright holders
voluntarily reconfigured their primary asset”).
110
Id. at 92.
111
See Field, supra note 68, at 328.
112
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 92.
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In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,113 the defendant, Jammie Thomas,
was sued for copyright infringement by Capitol Records because she had
downloaded twenty-four songs to which Capitol Records owned the
copyright without permission from Capitol, and then placed them on the
peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, from which others could also
download them without permission from Capitol.114
A jury found that Thomas had willfully infringed Capitol’s copyright
by reproducing and distributing the recordings.115 The jury instruction
under which Thomas was convicted stated that making copyrighted
recordings available for downloading on a peer-to-peer network constituted
distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution had occurred.116
Shortly afterwards, the court vacated the verdict because it concluded
that distribution of copyrighted materials required some affirmative act
beyond simply making the materials available for download by others.117
It granted Thomas a new trial with jury instructions amended to reflect that
understanding.118
Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the conduct of which
Capitol complained was technically illegal but obviously commonplace
and socially acceptable. As the court explained, “Thomas acted like
countless other Internet users. Her alleged acts were illegal, but

113

579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
Id. at 1212–13.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1213.
117
Id. at 1226–27.
118
Id. at 1227.
114
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common.”
It was not simply the commonness of her conduct that left
the court uncomfortable; it was the law’s evident failure to recognize that
her conduct was not blameworthy enough to merit a substantial damages
award.120 In other words, the court found that her conduct was not just
common, it was common because it was socially acceptable. The court
expressly stated that it was being placed in a position that was awkward at
best, and called upon Congress to change the law to better reflect the
reality of social acceptability.121 In fact, the court “implore[d] Congress to
amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages in peer-to-peer
network cases” such as Thomas.122
The court clearly felt it was risking the obvious in stating that “it
would be a farce to say that a single mother’s acts of using [KaZaA] are
the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global financial firms illegally
infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities market.”123 The
court noted that “Thomas not only gained no profits from her alleged
illegal activities, she sought no profits.”124 Instead she sought a most
pedestrian and socially acceptable benefit: “free music.”125 On re-trial, the
jury was not kind to Thomas: it awarded $1.9 million in damages.126 The
intensely negative public reaction to the damages award strongly suggests
that much of the public does not consider Thomas’s conduct particularly
blameworthy.127 In fact, upon review, Judge Davis slashed the damages
awarded to $54,000, writing that it was unjust to award more when
Thomas’s only goal was “obtaining free music.”128
Similarly, the case of confessed file-sharer Joel Tenenbaum has gained
significant publicity recently. The Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”) filed suit against Tenenbaum in August 2007, alleging
that he had illegally downloaded thirty songs.129 Tenenbaum eventually
119

Id. at 1227–28.
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Id. at 1227.
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Id.
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Id.
124
Id.
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Id.
126
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 2010); see also
Special Verdict Form at 17–20, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D.
Minn. 2010) (No. 006-CV-01497) (awarding $80,000 for each copyright work infringed upon, totaling
$1.9 million).
127
See, e.g., Nate Anderson, What’s Next for Jammie Thomas?, ARS TECHNICA (June 21, 2009,
8:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/whats-next-for-jammie-thomas-rasset.ars
(reporting that “the outrage isn’t confined to the blogosphere”); J.R. Raphael, Has the RIAA’s Fight
Against File-Sharing Gone Too Far?, PCWORLD (June 19, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
167058/has_the_riaas_fight_against_file_sharing_gone_too_far.html (reporting that in response to the
verdict against Thomas, “the blogosphere, as well as Twitter users, are buzzing with outrage”).
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Memorandum of Law & Order at 2, Capital Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d
1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (Civ. No. 06-1497), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/minnesota/mndce/0:2006cv01497/82850/366/.
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Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219 (D. Mass. 2009).
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admitted that he used the peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA to
download and share the copyrighted songs.130
United States District Court Judge Nancy Gertner expressed similar
misgivings as Judge Davis did in the Thomas case, expressly recognizing
that a shift in digital technology had created a shift in norms that made
formally illegal behavior common: “The advent of widespread internet
access in the late 1990s threw a number of norms into disarray, offering
sudden access to a wealth of digitized media and giving the veneer of
privacy or anonymity to acts that had public consequences.”131 She was
clearly unhappy with the prospect of imposing civil liability on people who
had acceded to the new norms, rather than obey the formal law, stating,
“there is a huge imbalance in these cases,” “[a]t a certain point after 133
cases in my court and countless others around the country, the plaintiffs are
going to realize this is making no sense and making them look bad,” “[the
case] should be over in a rational world . . . ,” and “I can’t say this is a
good situation or a fair situation, it is, however, the situation.”132
RIAA’s counsel, Eve Barton, defended its actions by declaring its
frustration that, essentially, society was ignoring the law in favor of norms
that permitted file-sharing133—in other words, that people were choosing to
behave within parameters of acceptable deviance rather than within the
law. As Judge Gertner noted, the Tenenbaum case was just one of many.
In 2003, RIAA launched a litigation campaign that has targeted 35,000
file-sharers.134 Interestingly, in the Tenenbaum case the voir dire process
was described by Judge Gertner as “one very long, very tortured day,” in
part because RIAA’s attorneys challenged each of the potential jurors who
admitted to file-sharing themselves.135
In pre-trial proceedings, Judge Gertner ruled that Tenenbaum could not
argue “fair use” as a defense.136 As a consequence, with Tenenbaum
130
See id. (stating that Tenenbaum argued “his file sharing constituted a ‘fair use’ under the
Copyright Act”).
131
Id. at 237.
132
Transcript of Motion Hr’g at 8–9, 25–26, Capitol Records, Inc., v. Noor Alaujan, 2009 WL
5873132 (2009) (No. 03-11661).
133
Id. at 26–28.
134
Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-people-turns-lawsuits-3-strikes.
135
Ben Sheffner, Tenenbaum Trial Begins with “Tortured” Jury Selection, ARS TECHNICA (July
27, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/tenenbaum-trial-opens-following-lastminute-dismissal-of-fair-use-defense.ars. The challenges were successful, which may help explain why
the jury was unsympathetic to Tenenbaum.
136
Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 220; see also Nate Anderson, Judge Rejects Fair Use
Defense as Tenenbaum P2P Trial Begins, ARS TECHNICA (July 27, 2009, 12:05 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/judge-rejects-fair-use-defense-as-tenenbaum-p2ptrial-begins.ars (stating that Judge Gertner “granted the record labels’ request for summary judgment on
the issue of fair use”). The doctrine of fair use, as described in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), provides that it
is not an infringement of copyright to copy an original work for purposes such as criticism, teaching,
scholarship, and research. Factors to be considered in determining whether a particular use is fair
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having admitted that he downloaded the files, Judge Gertner had little
choice but to enter judgment against him.137 The only issue left for the jury
to decide was damages.138
Tenenbaum recognized that his only hope was that the jury would
agree that his behavior was socially acceptable, even if formally illegal,
and essentially nullify the directed verdict entered against him by assigning
only nominal damages. His counsel openly appealed to the jury for
nullification, prompting a sustained objection from RIAA and anger from
Judge Gertner.139 The phenomenon of jury nullification is, in many ways,
an embodiment of the PADs model. It is an appeal to a jury, as in the
Tenenbaum case, to privilege socially acceptable deviance above socially
unacceptable enforcement of formal law.140 Jury nullification has, at times,
been regarded as a courageous embrace of norms over law: for example,
the acquittals of violators of the Fugitive Slave Act and Prohibition.141 In
this case, the jury did not nullify the directed verdict.142 Instead, it awarded
damages of $675,000, out of a possible $4.5 million in damages permitted
by the statute.143 Judge Gertner, like Judge Davis, then slashed the award
by ninety percent, reducing it to $67,500.144
The popularity of file-sharing, and the courts’ evident discomfort in
sanctioning it, suggests that this use of copyrighted music has moved from
illegal and socially unacceptable to illegal but socially acceptable. As
predicted by the evolutionary model of property rights, a change in social
include whether the use is commercial or not-for-profit, the effect of the use on the market value of the
original work, whether the copying is limited or encompasses the original work as a whole, and
whether it is in the public interest that access to the original work be unrestricted. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006). In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim that
copying music and sharing it on peer-to-peer networks was fair use of the copyrighted works, because
the original works were copied in their entirety and the use had a negative effect on the market value of
the original work and on the market for creative work generally. 239 F.3d 1004, 1015–17 (9th Cir.
2001).
137
Ben Sheffner, Fate of “Hardcore, Habitual” Infringer Tenenbaum up to Jury, ARS TECHNICA
(July 31, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/fate-of-hardcore-habitualinfringer-tenenbaum-up-to-jury.ars.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the
National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1256 (2003)
(describing past cases where jury nullification was used and “heralded as [a] courageous example[] of
political protest and moral integrity”).
141
Id.
142
Ben Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum! RIAA Wins $675,000, or $22,500 Per Song, ARS TECHNICA
(July 31, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-wins675000-or-22500-per-song.ars.
143
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–13 (2009). Hannaford-Agor and Hans distinguish between
nullification that results from disagreement about the content of law, and nullification that results from
perceived unfairness about the punishment associated with its violation. Hannaford-Agor & Hans,
supra note 140, at 1277. The relatively small amount of damages awarded, when compared to the
potentially liability, may suggest that the jury was more concerned about the fairness of punishment
than the fairness of the law itself. Id.
144
See Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Slashes Downloading Penalty, BOS. GLOBE, July 10, 2010, at 1.
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acceptability of file-sharing behavior has placed pressure on the boundaries
of legality. Only time will tell whether that behavior will migrate across
the boundary of legality, so that file-sharing becomes both socially
acceptable and legal. There is one indication that holders of copyright may
indeed be reluctantly bending to this pressure. Recently, RIAA announced
its decision to end its five-year campaign of lawsuits against file-sharers.145
The campaign did not ultimately reduce file-sharing.146 In fact, file-sharing
sites such as Limewire and BitTorrent have increased in hits, and have
become some of the most visited sites on the Internet.147 Peer-to-peer
networks now comprise forty-five percent of all internet traffic.148
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, by conservative
estimates, one in five American Internet users “is an active file-sharer.”149
If the regulated, by refusing to comply with the law, and the regulators, by
declining to enforce the law, implicitly agree that this form of deviance is
socially acceptable, that deviance becomes the de facto law for most of us.
As long as the practice remains formally illegal, however, the danger
inherent in the divergence between the legality and social acceptability of
behavior—selective enforcement—is very real. And that danger, predicted
by the PADs models, is evident in the cases of Jammie Thomas and Joel
Tenenbaum in the outrage that greeted the verdicts against them and the
frustration of Judges Davis and Gertner.150
In another example of property rights evolving to reflect changes in
normative sensibilities prompted by developments in digital technology,
“sampling” has become a recognized form of artistic expression. In
sampling, user-generated content piggybacks on copyrighted material, and
creates a new and, according to Lawrence Lessig, essentially democratic
form of expression not previously possible.151 Copyright owners have
reacted by taking steps to protect their rights. One prominent example of
this effort is the removal of copyrighted works from user-generated content
posted to YouTube (that is, self-made videos set to copyrighted music).152
Due to pressure from copyright holders, YouTube developed a technology
that permits copyright holders to discover use of their property on
145

von Lohmann, supra note 134.
ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (2008),
http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-later.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
von Lohmann, supra note 134.
150
See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 237 (D. Mass. 2009)
(stating that the court is “very, very concerned that there is a deep potential for injustice in the
Copyright Act as it is currently written”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227
(D. Minn. 2008) (urging Congress to amend the Copyright Act).
151
Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 968–70.
152
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A GUIDE TO YOUTUBE REMOVALS: SO MY VIDEO WAS REMOVED
FROM YOUTUBE . . . WHAT DO I NEED TO KNOW? (2009), http://www.eff.org/issues/intellectualproperty/guide-to-youtube-removals.
146
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153

YouTube.
The technology identifies brief portions of songs used in
user-posted videos, even if the song is never mentioned in the materials
describing the video.154 If the technology discovers copyrighted material,
it automatically removes it from the user-posted videos.155 Users have
responded to this practice with fury and disgust.156 This outrage and
derision at attempts to enforce the law is similar to the anger one might
expect from a driver issued a speeding ticket for driving sixty-seven m.p.h.
in a sixty-five m.p.h. zone.
Lawrence Lessig insightfully traces historical parallels to the current
controversy in the development of previous recording and distribution
technologies.157 He notes that the 1888 invention by George Eastman of
the Kodak camera made photography economically and technologically
accessible to large numbers of people and set off a similar crisis regarding
whether one could capture and copy the image of someone else without the
permission of that person.158 Lessig posits that had courts not found that
one could photograph and print without the subjects’ permission, the
viability of photography as a means of expression among nonprofessionals would have been in grave jeopardy.159 Whether music
sampling finds similar protection remains to be seen.
B. Use of Public Space
Communities are often self-organized in the face of growth.160 This
self-organization takes two primary forms: the creation of communities
self-organized by the race and economic status of their inhabitants, and the
informal delineation of appropriate and inappropriate behaviors in shared
public spaces.161
Another word for the first type of self-organization might be informal
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id. As a personal example, in 2008, I posted on YouTube two videos of highlights of my
eleven-year-old son’s baseball season so that his grandparents, who live several states away, could see
them. On the first, I included Jimi Hendrix’s version of the song Voodoo Child (Slight Return) as
accompaniment; on the second, I included the Average White Band’s song Pick Up the Pieces. I then
found a notice from YouTube informing me that I had violated copyright with regard to the second
video. As of this writing, my son can no longer pick up the pieces, but is still a voodoo child.
156
See, e.g., Matthew Humphries, Universal Sued by Angry Mother over YouTube Video
Removal, GEEK.COM (July 23, 2008, 10:52 AM), http://www.geek.com/articles/law/universal-sued-byangry-mother-over-youtube-video-removal-20080723 (describing how “[a]n angry mom has decided to
go to the courts after Universal has demanded a YouTube video of her son dancing be removed from
the popular site”).
157
See Lessig, supra note 151, at 961 (describing the history of camera technology).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 961–62.
160
See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 4 (1991) (stating that new urban
centers “contain all the functions a city ever has”).
161
See id. at 4, 282 (stating that the new urban communities are world of pioneers and
immigrants, as well as “a set of customs, behaviors, or attitudes”).
154
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segregation. Los Angeles, for example, has self-organized into at least
twenty-six different communities, most based on function and the race of
their inhabitants.162 This segregation is a form of self-organization that
today may emerge despite, rather than because of, zoning laws. Selfsegregation occurs regardless of law because social sanctions are applied to
unacceptably socially “deviant” behavior, regardless of its legality.163 That
socially “deviant” behavior unfortunately may include, for example, a
minority moving into a majority neighborhood. The social sanctions
applied to such “deviance” can include shunning164 and vandalism.165 On
that basis, neighborhoods may tend to self-segregate.
Similar self-organization emerges with regard to the use of public
spaces. Less attention has been directed to this phenomenon. For
example, the use of public sidewalks may be divided into uses along
vectors of legality and social acceptability. Window shopping is a use of
public sidewalks that is both legal and socially acceptable. Drug dealing,
by contrast, is a use of public sidewalks that is both illegal and generally
socially unacceptable. Enforcement to prevent this behavior is both
accepted and expected.
More interesting are instances in which the legality and social
acceptability of the use of public sidewalks diverge.
Religious
proselytizing is a legal use of public sidewalks that usually cannot generate
a formal enforcement response, since it is behavior protected by the First
However, because it may be generally socially
Amendment.166
unacceptable, it often evokes informal social sanctions in the absence of
formal ones. Proselytizers may find themselves the object of hard stares,
and other sidewalk users may cross the street to avoid them or to confront
them.
For example, members of the Westboro Baptist Church have garnered
infamy for proselytizing on sidewalks across from soldiers’ funerals.167
They display signs at the mourners and passersby, with messages such as,
162

Id. at 283.
See id. at 281 (“[F]orbidding walls around subdivisions make a kind of sense . . . . They are
social boundaries. They define ‘community’ and give it an entry point, financially and socially: only
certain people can get in.”).
164
See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & ROBERT F. MEIER, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 37
(12th ed. 2004) (discussing a conservative Mennonite community’s practice of shunning women who
deviate from the community’s strict dress code).
165
For example, minority homeowners are sometimes targeted with racist graffiti. See, e.g.,
Vandals Target Happy Valley Home with Racist Graffiti, Threaten To Burn Down Their House, THE
OREGONIAN,
(Sept.
3,
2010),
http://www.oregonlive.com/happy-valley/index.ssf/2010/09/
happy_valley_family_victims_of_racial_harassment.html.
166
See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153,
165–66, 168 (2002) (holding an Ohio ordinance regulating door-to-door canvassing, as applied to
religious proselytizing, to be in violation of the First Amendment).
167
Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2006, at A14.
163
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“Thank God for I.E.D.’s,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “You’re
Going to Hell.”168 The sect claims that God is punishing the United States
for tolerating homosexuality.169 Because the behavior of the sect is legal,
formal enforcement response is unlikely. Indeed, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the First Amendment
protects the group from a suit for emotional distress brought by the father
of a soldier killed in Iraq, after the group picketed his son’s funeral.170
However, because the behavior is socially unacceptable, informal social
sanctions in the form of popular justice and vigilantism is predictable and,
in fact, have occurred.171 A motorcycle club has launched a concerted
campaign to drown the sect out at funerals.172 More ominously, there have
been vigilante-style attacks on their demonstrations by outraged onlookers.173
On the other hand, performing on public sidewalks—such as by
musicians or magicians—is a behavior that is often formally illegal but
generally socially acceptable. Because this use is socially acceptable, a
formal enforcement response might be unlikely—people enjoying a
sidewalk performance would be unhappy to see the performer driven off
by a police officer. In other words, sidewalk performances are illegal but
well within the parameters of acceptable deviance, and legal institutions
bend to accommodate that normative sensibility. The same might be true
for simple aimless wandering.
The danger here is the “selective enforcement” malfunction caused by
behavior that is socially acceptable but formally illegal. Consider, for
example, the well-known Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville case.174 In
Papachristou, the Supreme Court heard the cases of eight people arrested
for “vagrancy” by Jacksonville, Florida police.175 All were convicted, and
their separated cases were consolidated for appeal.176 Four of the
defendants—Margaret Papachristou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Melton, and
Leonard Johnson—were arrested together and convicted of “vagrancy—
‘prowling by auto.’”177 The four were on a double-date, driving on
168

Id.
See Westboro Baptist Church, FAQ, GODHATESFAGS, http://www.godhatesfags.com/
faq.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
170
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 210–11, 226 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1737 (2010).
171
5 Arrested for Attacks on Anti-Gay Protesters at Military Funeral, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May
22, 2006, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196487,00.html.
172
Ryan Lenz, Motorcycle Club Blocks Protesters, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at A09.
173
See 5 Arrested for Attacks, supra note 171 (stating that when members of the Westboro Baptist
Church protested at a military funeral, “a man broke through the police line and began assaulting two
of the Westboro protesters”).
174
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
175
Id. at 156.
176
Id. at 156–57.
177
Id. at 158.
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Jacksonville’s main thoroughfare from a restaurant where they had eaten
dinner.178 Eugene Melton and Leonard Johnson were African American;
Margaret Papachristou and Betty Calloway were white.179
The vagrancy ordinance which the four were convicted of violating
prohibited “[r]ogues and vagabonds . . . persons who use juggling . . .
common night walkers . . . [and] persons wandering or strolling around,”
among many other things.180 Oddly, “prowling by auto,” the crime for
which the defendants were convicted, was not on the list of prohibited
activities, but Florida asserted that “prowling by auto” was encompassed
within “wandering or strolling around.”181 The Supreme Court struck the
ordinance down under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process doctrine of
“void for vagueness.”182 The Court explained that the Jacksonville
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in two senses.183 First, it
failed to give adequate notice of what it prohibited.184 Second, just as the
PADs model suggests, the ordinance was ripe for selective enforcement,
since it outlawed behavior that was common and socially acceptable—and
which generally did not generate a formal enforcement response—despite
its formal illegality.185
Use of Public Sidewalks
Legal

Shopping
Normatively Acceptable

Normatively Unacceptable

Illegal

Performing for $

(Day Labor
Markets)

Day Labor
Markets

--Funeral
Demonstrations
---

(Day Labor
Markets)
(Funeral
Demonstrations?)

Drug Dealing
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Id. at 158–59.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 156–57 n.1.
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Id. at 168 n.11.
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Id. at 162.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id. at 163 (“The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by modern
standards are normally innocent.”).
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A contemporary embodiment of the Papachristou problem may
involve the use of public space for informal markets for day laborers.186
Each morning in public spaces throughout the United States, men and
women gather hoping to be hired for short-term employment, primarily in
construction and landscaping.187 Although the practice has existed for
decades,188 anti-immigration sentiment has produced a backlash against
it189 because unemployment is rising and in recent years the day labor
market participants are disproportionately Latino immigrants.190
Groups representing day laborers have challenged the enforcement of
ordinances prohibiting day labor markets on public property on the same
grounds raised in the Papachristou case, arguing that the ordinances are so
vague that selective enforcement is inevitable, and they impinge on free
speech rights.191 In response to concern about the presence of day laborers,
the city of Redondo Beach, California enacted an ordinance prohibiting
standing on sidewalks or other public ways in order to solicit employment
or business of any kind.192 The court found that the ordinance was much
broader than necessary to promote the city’s legitimate interests in traffic
safety, crime prevention, and aesthetics.193 The court noted that,
interpreted literally, the ordinance would prohibit not just day labor
markets, but also people hailing cabs and children selling lemonade.194
That breadth invited selective enforcement against the real targets of the
ordinance: day laborers.195 Moreover, the city had not provided an
adequate alternative space for the day laborers to gather, in that it had
banned them from all public property in the city.196
As is often the case, where behavior is legal but socially unacceptable,
186
See Gregg W. Kettles, Day Labor Markets and Public Space, 78 UMKC L. REV. 139, 140
(2009) (“Those who favor exclusion lobby local government to stop building shelters and start
enforcing laws against street-side day labor markets.”).
187
ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_
Corner1.pdf.
188
See id. at 2 (stating that historically, employers in the United States have relied on day labor to
fill jobs in various occupations).
189
See id. at 23. At earlier periods in our history, anti-immigration sentiment has expressed itself
through attempted restrictions on the use of public space for day labor markets. At the turn of the
century, for example, anti-Chinese immigration attitudes led to the enactment, by Los Angeles, of
restrictions on the ability of laborers to solicit work from public spaces. See Renia Ehrenfeucht &
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Constructing the Sidewalks: Municipal Government and the Production
of Public Space in Los Angeles, California, 1880–1920, 33 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 104, 117 (2007).
190
VALENZUELA ET AL., supra note 187, at 1, 17.
191
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2–4, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo
Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CV 04-9396
CBMPJWX), available at http://maldef.org/assets/pdf/redondo_beach_complaint.pdf, rev’d, 607 F.3d
1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).
192
Comite de Jornaleros, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63.
193
Id. at 964–66.
194
Id. at 965 & n.8.
195
Id. at 965.
196
Id. at 967–68.
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the danger of “popular justice” is very real. Recently in Riverside,
California, local neo-Nazis massed at the site of an informal day labor
market with the express goal of shutting it down.197 Violence erupted
between the Nazis and members of a Latino activist group.198 In a second
California community, anti-immigration groups sponsored a rally in
support of the arrests of day laborers for soliciting work on public land,
after immigrant rights groups sued to stop the arrests.199
Other jurisdictions have enacted anti-day labor ordinances that have
yet to be challenged in court. The town of Oyster Bay, New York, for
example, has resorted to increasingly stringent measures to prevent
immigrants from using public space to secure day labor employment.200 It
recently enacted an ordinance which prohibits “solicitation of
employment” by, among other things, “waving arms, making hand
signals,” or standing in public roads in the direction of oncoming traffic.201
The town of Huntington Station, New York, recently went a step further: it
ordered a private landowner who had allowed immigrant laborers to live in
makeshift homes on his lot next to a hiring center to “clear it of garbage
and debris.”202 The workers’ tents were leveled, although many of their
possessions remained on the land.203 Town officials suggested that without
a place to live, the day laborers might “seek employment in other
locations.”204
As the PADs model predicts, with regard to the use of public spaces,
behavior like performing that is formally illegal may be socially
acceptable, while behavior like day labor markets that are formally legal
may be socially unacceptable. Those divergences produce unique stresses
in legal institutions. Where day labor markets are recognized as legal, but
are socially unacceptable because of the perceived immigration status of
their participants, the danger of popular justice may manifest itself in
violent acts such as those committed by the neo-Nazis in Riverside. On the
other hand, as the court in Comite de Jornaleros recognized, a broad
197
Lora Hines, 2 Arrests in Brief Violence at Neo-Nazi Rally, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside,
Cal.), Oct. 25, 2009, at C1 (“Jeff Hall, a Riverside resident and state director of the National Socialist
Movement, said the group met its goal—to shut down the day labor site. ‘We’re going to be here again
and again,’ he said.”).
198
Id.
199
Dawnya Pring, Rally Planned To Oppose Day Laborers, REDONDO BEACH NEWS (Jan. 6,
2005, 9:22 AM), http://tbrnews.com/articles/2005/01/06/redondo_beach_news/news14.txt.
200
Robin Finn, Town Divides over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at
MB1.
201
TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, N.Y., CODE § 205-32 (2010), available at http://gcp.esub.net (follow
“PC/CodeBook—Code of the Town of Oyster Bay, NY” hyperlink; then type “205-32” in the search
box).
202
Karen Zraick, For Suffolk Day Laborers, Times Get Tougher as Makeshift Homes Are Leveled,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A32.
203
Id.
204
Id.
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prohibition on common uses of public space—encompassing a wide range
of behaviors that includes day labor markets—creates the very real danger
of selective enforcement motivated by the race or ethnicity of the
participants rather than by any actual disruption caused by their
behavior.205
C. Foreclosure and Eviction
The mortgage crisis—and the epidemic of foreclosures it has
spawned—has destabilized norms regarding the social acceptability of
behavior with regard to real estate possession. One of the most pernicious
effects of the mortgage crisis has been the eviction of blameless tenants.
Leases are usually terminated by foreclosure.206 Tenants who have never
missed a rent payment, and who have no idea that their landlord has not
been applying rent payments to their mortgage obligations, suddenly face
eviction—often with no notice.207 The problem is so pervasive, and so
normatively objectionable, that county sheriffs upon whom the burden of
eviction falls have been refusing to carry out the evictions under some
circumstances.208 For example, Thomas Dart, the sheriff of Cook County,
Illinois, unilaterally imposed a moratorium on the eviction of renters in
foreclosed properties, over the howling objections of the banks.209
Similarly, the sheriffs of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Wayne County,
Michigan, have refused to evict blameless tenants.210

205
That may be particularly true of day labor markets since, as at least one researcher has found,
day laborers tend to establish and enforce order amongst themselves, rewarding responsible behavior
with referrals to, and priority placement with, employers. Carolyn Pinedo Turnovsky, Doing the
Corner: A Study in Immigrant Day Laborers in Brooklyn, New York (Oct. 17, 2005) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 2006) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
206
For a state-by-state summary of the relevant law, see NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL.,
FORECLOSURE AND EVICTION PRACTICES BY STATE: DRAFT 7/25/2008 (2008), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/doc/State-Foreclosure-Chart.pdf.
207
Id.
208
See US Sheriffs Don’t Want People Evicted as Foreclosure Rates Expected To Soar in New
Year, PROPERTYWIRE (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.propertywire.com/news/north-america/us-sheriffsforeclosure-rates-200812122249.html (stating that county sheriffs are refusing to process property
eviction orders).
209
See Illinois Sheriff Scolds Banks for Evction of ‘Innocent’ Renters, CNN (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-10-08/us/chicago.evictions_1_eviction-notices-mortgage-paymentsmortgage-companies?_s=PM:US (quoting the Illinois Bankers Association as describing Dart’s refusal
to carry out evictions as “vigilantism at the highest level” and a “declaration of ‘martial law’”).
210
Amy Goodman, Facing Foreclosure? Don’t Leave. Squat., ALTERNET (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://www.alternet.org/rights/125533/.
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Often institutions of enforcement do not enforce the law but instead
enforce the limits of acceptable deviance around the law. When they are
called upon to enforce the law in a manner that conflicts with standards of
social acceptability, it is often the institutions that give way rather than the
standards. Therefore, it is not surprising that some sheriffs are refusing to
carry out evictions; they are bending to norms of acceptable deviance. Nor
is it surprising that Congress and many state jurisdictions are enacting laws
to limit the power of banks to evict blameless tenants in foreclosed
properties.211 The social acceptability of possession by blameless tenants
following foreclosure is pressuring the law to evolve. Norms drive law.
In addition to the illegality but social acceptability of holdovers by
blameless tenants, illegal squatting in foreclosed homes is becoming both
more pervasive and, apparently, more socially acceptable.212
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur recently urged people whose mortgages
have been foreclosed to become squatters in their former homes.213
According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, advocacy groups
around the United States are taking possession of foreclosed properties for
the homeless—often openly.214
211
See Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1632,
1660–61 (2009) (permitting renters of foreclosed properties to remain in possession for ninety days, or
until the property is sold to someone who will occupy it).
212
See Goodman, supra note 210 (describing how Congresswoman Kaptur has advised
homeowners facing foreclosure to stay in their property instead of leaving).
213
Id.
214
John Leland, With Advocates’ Help, More Squatters Call Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2009, at A1.
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The advocacy groups report that they sometimes get support from
neighbors, in part because occupied houses stay in better condition, and
attract less crime than abandoned, foreclosed homes.215 Abandoned homes
may become havens for drug use and targets for copper thieves, who rip
out walls to get copper plumbing and wire.216 By contrast, Take Back the
Land, a Florida-based advocacy group, screens squatters it helps to find
abandoned homes, and requires them to earn “sweat equity” by cleaning
and repairing the homes.217 “As far as the neighbors are concerned, the
current tenants—squatters though they are—are a vast improvement over
the crack den the vacant house had become.”218
It is reminiscent of the squatters’ rights movement of the 1970s and
1980s in cities in the northeastern United States. 219 The movement placed
members of the growing homeless population in a large number of
abandoned and condemned buildings. Squatters, though acting illegally,
brought order rather than disorder into swaths of cities that stood
abandoned. In Peñalver and Kaytal’s words, “[u]rban squatters were fixing
broken windows, not breaking them. It is perhaps for this reason that
neighborhood residents were typically supportive of squatting efforts,
notwithstanding their illegality.”220
Even in utilitarian terms, formally illegal behavior with regard to
property rights may be justified if the actor places a higher value on the
property than the true owner, and is unable to transact because, for
example, they have been evicted through foreclosure.221 As Peñalver and
Katyal succinctly put it, “[o]n a cold night, at least as a purely subjective
matter, the homeless man almost certainly values the sheltered entrance of
a large shopping center more highly than even the most attentive owners
value their right to exclude him.”222
The same banks that are socially sanctioned for evicting blameless
tenants are also socially sanctioned for boarding up foreclosed properties
that they own.223 In fact, a number of local governments have recently
215
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that the neighbors believe the current tenants, though they are squatters, are better than letting the
vacant houses become crack dens).
216
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http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1723193,00.html.
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proposed or enacted laws either prohibiting banks from neglecting
foreclosed properties, or at least assessing them for the upkeep of the
properties performed by local governments.224
Interestingly, some state and federal court judges are resisting
foreclosures not by resisting application of the formal law, but by insisting
upon it to the letter.225 For example, Judge Arthur M. Shack of the New
York State Supreme Court has made it a personal mission to throw sand on
the tracks of the foreclosure process by insisting that each and every
requirement of the formal law is satisfied.226 In the words of Judge Shack,
“[i]f you are going to take away someone’s house, everything should be
legal and correct.”227
In summation, then, possession of foreclosed properties by blameless
tenants is moving from illegal but socially acceptable to legal and socially
acceptable. Occupation of foreclosed homes by squatters may be moving
from illegal and socially unacceptable to illegal but socially acceptable.
And neglect of foreclosed homes by banks is moving from legal but
socially unacceptable to illegal and socially unacceptable. As predicted,
these behaviors with regard to property move counter-clockwise around
the PADs model, with changes in normative sensibility re-defining the
scope and meaning of property rights.
D. Natural Resources
There are two generally accepted, forceful utilitarian arguments that
support the existence and protection of the right to exclude others from
one’s property: the prevention of overuse on the one hand, and the creation
of proper incentives for resource development as costs and benefits accrue
to the owner of the resource, on the other.228 Of course, neither argument
has force unless the object in question can be treated as property from
which others may be excluded. The Roman property law category of res
communes refers to resources whose character makes them “incapable” of
exclusively appropriating.229 Resources in this category are—in utilitarian
thought—not treated as property because they cannot be, not because they
224
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should not be. As Carol Rose has noted, however, advances in both legal
thought and scientific measurement have turned things once thought
exempt from ownership into objects that can be appropriated.230 Things
once thought to fall well within the category of res communes—such as the
air—are now amenable to appropriation—for example, through the
purchase or sale of a portion of it for use as a receptacle for pollution
through cap-and-trade systems. As the controversy surrounding cap-andtrade systems demonstrates, now that such resources can be treated as
property, we are forced to consider the question of whether they should
be.231
The allocation of rights in natural resources frequently displays
divergences between legality and social acceptability. Consider fishing
rights. In the absence of private rights, over-exploitation threatens the
common fish stock, “a problem inherent in the uncontrolled exploitation of
common property resources everywhere.”232 To prevent over-exploitation,
some governments sell fishing rights as “a payment for the exploitation of
common fishing grounds.”233 Formal property law, however, “works in the
background of many different systems of rules presiding over the
allocation of scarce resources,”234 including informal and deviant systems.
In an insightful observational study of fishing communities in Norway
and Newfoundland, Stig Gezelius noted this phenomenon.235 He found
that compliance with fishing regulations depended upon notions of social
acceptability.236 Some illegal behaviors were socially acceptable and some
were not; some legal behaviors were socially acceptable and some were
not. The model below suggests how some behaviors are categorized.
230
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Natural Resources Law and Fishing
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The Newfoundland village was almost entirely dependent upon fishing
for its economic survival.237 Severe reductions in the cod stock in
Canadian waters, however, led to drastic restrictions on fishing rights.238
The restrictions resulted in real economic hardship for the people of the
village, but were generally accepted as necessary to restore the stock for
the future.239 Therefore, it was both legal and socially acceptable to fish
within the limits set by the regulators.
By contrast, some fishermen had developed reputations as cheaters,
over-fishing and selling their excess catch on the black market.240 The
cheaters were subject to both informal social sanctions—gossip, hard
stares, injured reputations—and formal ones. They were informed upon to
authorities, who punished them.241
More complex, and more interesting, were behaviors where the legality
and social acceptability of behavior diverged. For example, corporate
trawlers—large commercial business operations based offshore, just
beyond the reach of Canadian territorial waters—were engaged in legal
activity.242 Nonetheless, they were scorned and generally despised by the
village fishermen. Despite a lack of hard evidence, they were blamed for
237
See id. at 2 (“Fishing and fish processing are the only significant industries in the community,
and there are few employment opportunities besides these.”).
238
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239
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240
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241
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overfishing the cod stock and causing the crisis regulations. Because the
corporate trawlers were engaged in legal behavior, no formal enforcement
response could occur. In its place, the corporate trawlers were subject to
informal, albeit ineffective, social sanctions—popular anger, disparaging
rumors, and occasional threats.244 Elsewhere, however, Canadian fishers
resorted to “popular justice” measures against perceived transgressors,
including blockading ships from other nations.245
On the other hand, in light of the restrictions, where before poaching
had been both illegal and socially unacceptable, now the village residents
found it socially acceptable, albeit still illegal, to catch cod for personal
consumption.246 The villagers considered consumption morally justifiable,
while selling cod was reprehensible.247 Interestingly, because catching cod
for personal consumption was socially acceptable, little enforcement action
was taken to prevent it by authorities, despite its illegality.248 Where
legality and social acceptability diverged, legal institutions enforced
property rights against behaviors that were outside the parameters of
socially acceptable deviance, but not against behaviors that were illegal but
within parameters of acceptable deviance.
Iceland decided to protect fish stocks by allocating fishing permits and
implementing catch quotas.249 When the law250 was implemented, only
ships which had been fishing during the period between November 1980
and October 1983 were eligible for an allocation of fishing rights.251
Permits were issued to fishing vessel owners based on their average
catches during that time.252 The permits are tradable.253 Later entrants to
the market would have to buy their way in by purchasing or leasing rights
from those who received the initial allocation.254
243
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The Icelandic quota system has been successful in reducing the overall
catch, thus conserving the common fish stock in Icelandic waters.255 But it
has generated controversy among Icelanders, because the initial allocation
of tradable fishing permits was made free of charge.256 As a result,
potential new entrants into the industry find that they must buy the right to
compete from their potential competitors,257 even though the Supreme
Court of Iceland has declared that “stocks of ocean life are the common
property of the Icelandic nation.”258 As economist Thorvaldur Gylfason
posed the question, “does a government have an unqualified right to
discriminate among citizens by giving a relatively small group of
individuals free and marketable access to a valuable natural resource which
is, by law, the common property of the nation?”259
The Icelandic courts have upheld the system, but not without some
obvious misgivings. In the words of the Icelandic Supreme Court, “a
significant part of the Icelandic nation was barred in advance from
enjoying . . . a comparable share of the common property . . . as the
comparatively few . . . who possessed ships active in fishing at the time
limitations to fishing were originally imposed.”260 In fact, the court has
strongly implied that its patience with the system is not indefinite:
Although temporary measures of this kind [allocating
rights without charge to some market participants, but forcing
subsequent market participants to purchase rights from those
who received rights for free] . . . to avert the collapse of fish
stocks may have been justifiable . . . providing permanently
by law for discrimination . . . cannot be regarded as logically
necessary.261
The perception that the system is unfair has led to open defiance. In an
extraordinary case before the Icelandic Supreme Court, one fishing
company openly defied the rights allocation system after discovering that it
could not afford to purchase fishing rights on the Icelandic Quota
Exchange.262 In order to challenge the system in court, the defendants
notified the Ministry of Fisheries that they would violate the law, and told
255
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the authorities when and where their ship would be docking.
They were
charged with having caught approximately 34,000 kilograms of cod over
the course of a week-long fishing trip, without rights to catch any.264 The
head of the company admitted the charge, but argued that as an Icelandic
citizen he was entitled to use the common fish stock on an equal basis with
other citizens, without having to lease rights from other private citizens
who had received them for free.265 He claimed he had been unable to
afford to purchase rights from private parties on the Quota Exchange, and
that to require him to do so would deny him right to choice of profession,
and his right to equal treatment by the government, in violation of the
Icelandic Constitution.266 The Icelandic Supreme Court agreed with the
defendants that the system was unfair to them, but held that it did not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.267
The case was subsequently brought before the United Nations’ Human
Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.268 The United Nations Committee disagreed with the Icelandic
Supreme Court, finding that the system did, in fact, violate the defendants’
constitutionally protected right to pursue employment freely and to be free
from discrimination by the Icelandic government.269 The Icelandic
government ignored the United Nations ruling, however, and continued to
use the same rights allocation system.270 According to attorney Ludvik
Kaaber who represented the defendants, defiance of the system is
increasingly common and enforcement against violators is difficult and
rare.271
It is interesting to note that the Icelandic experience undermines the
Coasean idea that in the absence of transaction costs, the initial allocation
of property rights does not matter, because subsequent trade among private
parties will produce an efficient outcome.272 Transaction costs, of course,
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are inevitable in the allocation of property rights, but it is not transaction
costs that have produced resistance to the Icelandic system. The Icelandic
experience suggests that an initial allocation that is perceived as unfair may
result in a common view that the law itself produces behavior that is
socially unacceptable, and that defying it is socially acceptable. In that
situation, as we have seen, people tend to be governed by norms of social
acceptability rather than law. In other words, the efficient outcome
envisaged by the new property rights system is undermined because people
act outside the law. It is perhaps the initial allocation of rights itself that is
the transaction cost that a fair and efficient market cannot overcome.
Peñalver and Katyal find a similar example in the role of settlers of
land in the American west.274 Settlers routinely engaged in formally illegal
behavior in grabbing land to which they were not entitled.275 The position
of the settlers and a large part of society was that those willing to work the
land should own it, regardless of whether legal title was held by absentee
land speculators in the eastern states.276 Their activity was more than
socially acceptable, despite its formal deviance—it was seen in some
quarters as heroic.277 Thus, though their behavior was formally deviant,
the settlers “remained true to their normative community . . . .”278
As Peñalver and Katyal make clear, eastern politicians reacted with
outrage, calling the settlers “‘lawless rabble’” and insisting they be
prosecuted for criminal trespass.279 To overcome formal law, settlers
successfully appealed to juries to nullify verdicts against them, privileging
socially acceptable deviance over formal law.280 In addition to defiant
juries, state courts and legislatures expanded common law doctrines such
as adverse possession to favor settlers.281 Eventually, the “settlers’
continued refusal to recognize the rights of absentee owners rendered the
federal government’s pro-speculator stance untenable.”282 The federal
government eventually went so far as to enact the Homestead Act,
legalizing settlers’ once deviant seizure of federal lands.283
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V. LAW’S ANCHORING FUNCTION
Property, an inherently social institution, is influenced not just by law,
but by norms of the social acceptability of behavior. Where property law
and norms of social acceptability converge, legal institutions function well.
Where they diverge, legal institutions tend to falter, and social
acceptability rather than law tends to control behavior. Applying the
acceptable deviance model to the normative evolutionary theory of
property rights, we see that behaviors that are socially unacceptable but
legal generate informal sanctions and, eventually, may become illegal.
Behaviors that are socially acceptable but illegal tend not to generate
sanctions, despite their formal illegality, and may eventually become legal.
In this way, property rights evolve with changes in normative sensibilities,
rotating counter-clockwise through the acceptable deviance model.
As the PADs model predicts, eventually the law must change to reflect
normative sensibilities. And that is, in fact, what we see. In the case of
copyright, sharing music is moving across the normative boundary from
illegal-and-socially-unacceptable to illegal-but-socially-acceptable. As the
controversy over the Thomas and Tenenbaum cases suggests, the next
movement may be crossing the boundary from illegality to legality. Rising
unemployment and anti-immigration sentiment are pushing day labor
markets first from the legal-and-socially-acceptable quadrant to the legalbut-socially-unacceptable quadrant, and now in some jurisdictions into
illegal-and-socially-unacceptable quadrant. In response to the foreclosure
crisis, we see squatting moving across the normative boundary from
socially unacceptable to socially acceptable, and possession of foreclosed
property by blameless tenants moving from illegality to legality. Finally,
in the case of fishing rights, behaviors such as poaching for consumption
that were once both illegal and socially unacceptable became socially
acceptable, pressuring the law to follow.
Deviance from law, in favor of social acceptability, is not necessarily
harmful. In fact, it can protect important community values embedded
within property law regimes, such as norms of sharing, utilizing natural
resources to feed one’s family, interacting with one’s community in public
spaces, and protecting blameless victims of the foreclosure crisis. As
Peñalver and Katyal say, “[p]roperty scholars should be attentive to the
criminal enforcement of property laws and the ways in which that
enforcement may unfairly punish or overdeter justified and useful
lawbreaking by property outlaws.”284 In one sense, acceptable deviance is
similar to Daniel Markovits’s concept of “democratic deficits.”285
According to Markovits, illegal behavior is both justified and unavoidable
284
285
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when there is a “democratic deficit”—when the law has not changed to
reflect popular sentiment because of a flaw in the democratic process.286
These divergences can also have serious negative effects to which legal
institutions are ill-prepared to respond. Behavior that is legal but socially
unacceptable cannot generate a formal enforcement response from the
state. In the state’s absence, “popular justice” measures such as
vigilantism may be taken by some in the community. Thus day laborers in
California may be confronted by violent neo-Nazis, and the religious
fanatics from the Westboro Church are confronted by enraged mobs.287 On
the other hand, behavior that is illegal but socially acceptable usually does
not generate an enforcement response. Unlawfully-motivated state actors,
however, may enforce formal law and immunize themselves from the
consequences of unlawful motivation because of the formal illegality of the
behavior. Thus, because of their race or ethnicity, some loiterers or day
laborers might be arrested and not others; some blameless tenants may be
evicted and not others.
Recognizing the role of acceptable deviance both enriches our
understanding of property rights and enhances our ability to detect the
predictable malfunctions in legal institutions triggered by divergences
between the legality of behavior with regard to property, and the social
acceptability of that behavior. It also allows us to recognize that although
behavior with respect to property rights—and thus the evolution of
property rights—may occur within parameters of normatively acceptable
deviance around law rather than according to the law itself, the evolution
of property rights is not chaos. Behavior may not mirror law, but neither
does it exist without reference to law. Law seems to function as an anchor
on behavior. Anchors allow a limited amount of drift. The anchor
provided by law allows enough deviance to permit evolution in response to
changes in normative sensibilities and economic incentives, while at the
same time providing enough stability to support a functioning society.
Perhaps in the end that is the beauty of the relationship between acceptable
deviance and property rights—it provides both stability and the freedom to
evolve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Property rights evolve in response to changes in normative
sensibilities. Similarly, compliance with, and deviance from, law is often
dependent upon the law’s convergence with, or divergence from,
286
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normative sensibilities. Where the legality and social acceptability of
behavior diverge, deviance is socially acceptable. By applying a model of
acceptable deviance to property rights, we can predict and actually observe
the evolution of property rights in response to changes in normative
sensibilities in areas as diverse as natural resources, copyright,
foreclosures, and the use of public space. We can also predict and observe
stresses in legal institutions created by divergences in the legality and
social acceptability of behavior with regard to property rights. Law
functions not as a straightjacket but rather as an anchor on behavior,
providing stability, but also space for deviance which permits the evolution
of property rights.

